Hacker News
4 hours ago by joshmn

It’s notable that there were ShinyHunters members arrested by the FBI a few years ago. I was in prison with Sebastian Raoult, one of them. We talked quite a bit.

The level of persistence these guys went through to phish at scale is astounding—which is how they gained most of their access. They’d otherwise look up API endpoints on GitHub and see if there were any leaked keys (he wasn’t fond of GitHub's automated scanner).

https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/member-notorious-intern...

2 hours ago by rkozik1989

Generally speaking, humans are more often than not the weakest link the chain when it comes to cyber security, so the fact that most of their access comes from social engineering isn't the least bit surprising.

They themselves are likely to some extent the victims of social engineering as well. After all who benefits from creating exploits for online games and getting children to become script kiddies? Its easier (and probably safer) to make money off of cyber crime if your role isn't committing the crimes yourself. It isn't illegal to create premium software that could in theory be use for crime if you don't market it that way.

an hour ago by Thorrez

>It isn't illegal to create premium software that could in theory be use for crime if you don't market it that way.

Who is making money off of selling premium software, that's not marketed as for cybercrime, to non-governmental attackers? Wouldn't the attackers just pirate it?

an hour ago by dheatov

Feel like IDA Pro counts.

an hour ago by undefined
[deleted]
3 hours ago by ants_everywhere

> (he wasn’t fond of GitHub's automated scanner

Do you mean they thought the scanner was effective and weren't fond of it because it disrupted their business? Or do you mean they had a low opinion of the scanner because it was ineffective?

3 hours ago by joshmn

He would complain that it disrupted their business, and that it doesn't catch all keys—it catches the big ones that he certainly found to be very valuable.

2 hours ago by red-iron-pine

> The level of persistence these guys went through to phish at scale is astounding—which is how they gained most of their access.

explain

an hour ago by the_gipsy

[flagged]

an hour ago by ChrisMarshallNY

That’s standard practice, on HN, and has been, before AI was a broken condom on the drug store shelf.

Unpleasant, but comes with the territory (I don’t like it, when it’s done to me).

That said, I’m not sure that kind of scolding is particularly effective, either.

an hour ago by oersted

Not every culture has the same standards of politeness. I didn't think it was rude, I think it can be even respectful of their time and intelligence to be concise, plain and direct, as long as you are not literally attacking them.

I mean, the comments under the GPT-5.1 announcement just today were full of people wishing that AI actually responded to them like this.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45904551

7 hours ago by throwaway2037

I love this part (no trolling from me):

    > We are sorry. We regret that this incident has caused worry for our partners and people. We have begun the process to identify and contact those impacted and are working closely with law enforcement and the relevant regulators. We are fully committed to maintaining your trust.
I know there will by a bunch of cynics who say that an LLM or a PR crisis team wrote this post... but if they did, hats off. It is powerful and moving. This guys really falls on his sword / takes it on the chin.
7 hours ago by sigmoid10

I'll never not think of that South Park scene where they mocked BP's "We're so sorry" statement whenever I see one of those. I don't care if you're sorry or if you realize how much you betrayed your customers. Tell me how you investigated the root causes of the incident and how the results will prevent this scenario from ever happening again. Like, how many other deprecated third party systems were identified handling a significant portion of your customer data after this hack? Who declined to allocate the necessary budget to keep systems updated? That's the only way I will even consider giving some trust back. If you really want to apologise, start handing out cash or whatever to the people you betrayed. But mere words like these are absolutely meaningless in today's world. People are right to dismiss them.

6 hours ago by jacquesm

I wouldn't be so quick. Everybody gets hacked, sooner or later. Whether they'll own up to it or not is what makes the difference and I've seen far, far worse than this response by Checkout.com, it seems to be one of the better responses to such an event that I've seen to date.

> Like, how many other deprecated third party systems were identified handling a significant portion of your customer data after this hack?

The problem with that is that you'll never know. Because you'd have to audit each and every service provider and I think only Ebay does that. And they're not exactly a paragon of virtue either.

> Who declined to allocate the necessary budget to keep systems updated?

See: prevention paradox. Until this sinks in it will happen over and over again.

> But mere words like these are absolutely meaningless in today's world. People are right to dismiss them.

Again, yes, but: they are at least attempting to use the right words. Now they need to follow them up with the right actions.

5 hours ago by benchly

> Everybody gets hacked, sooner or later.

Right! But, wouldn't a more appropriate approach be to mitigate the damage from being hacked as much as possible in the first place? Perhaps this starts by simplifying bloated systems, reducing data collection to data that which is only absolutely legally necessary for KYC and financial transactions in whatever respective country(ies) the service operates in, hammer-testing databases for old tricks that seem to have been forgotten about in a landscape of hacks with ever-increasingly complexity, etc.

Maybe it's the dad in me, years of telling me son to not apologize, but to avoid the behavior that causes the problem in the first place. Bad things happen, and we all screw up from time to time, that is a fact of life, but a little forethought and consideration about the best or safest way to do a thing is a great way to shrink the blast area of any surprise bombs that go off.

36 minutes ago by adrianN

The prevention paradox only really applies when the bad event has significant costs. It seems to me that getting hacked has at worst mild consequences. Cisco for example is still doing well despite numerous embarrassing backdoors.

6 hours ago by sharken

Well said, ideally action comes first and then these actions can be communicated.

But in the real world, you have words ie. commitment before actions and a conclusion.

Best of luck to them.

6 hours ago by BoredPositron

There are millions of companies even century or decade old ones without a hacking incident with data extraction. The whole everyone gets hacked is copium for a lack of security standards or here the lack of deprecation and having unmantained systems online with legacy client data. Announcing it proudly would be concerning if I had business with them. It's not even a lack of competence... it's a lack of hygiene.

4 hours ago by bargainbin

The intent of the South Park sketch was to lampoon that BP were (/are) willingly doing awful things and then give corpo apology statements when caught.

Here, Checkout has been the victim of a crime, just as much as their impacted customers. It’s a loss for everyone involved except the perpetrators. Using words like “betrayed” as if Checkout wilfully mislead its customers, is a heavy accusation to level.

At a point, all you can do is apologise, offer compensation if possible, and plot out how you’re going to prevent it going forward.

3 hours ago by ImPostingOnHN

> At a point, all you can do is apologise, offer compensation if possible, and plot out how you’re going to prevent it going forward.

I totally agree – You've covered the 3 most important things to do here: Apologize; make it right; sufficiently explain in detail to customers how you'll prevent recurrences.

After reading the post, I see the 1st of 3. To their credit, most companies don't get that far, so thanks, Checkout.com. Now keep going, 2 tasks left to do and be totally transparent about.

5 hours ago by josfredo

No trolling on my side, I think having people who think just like you is a triumph for humanity. As we approach times far darker and manipulation takes smarter shapes, a cynical mind is worth many trophies.

5 hours ago by ema

> prevent this scenario from ever happening again.

Every additional nine of not getting hacked takes effort. Getting to 100% takes infinite effort i.e. is impossible. Trying to achieve the impossible will make you spin on the spot chasing ever more obscure solutions.

As soon as you understand a potential solution enough to implement it you also understand that it cannot achieve the impossible. If you keep insisting on achieving the impossible you have to abandon this potential solution and pin your hope on something you don't understand yet. And so the cycle repeats.

It is good to hold people accountable but only demand the impossible from those you want to go crazy.

5 hours ago by stellas9099

[dead]

7 hours ago by M4v3R

Words are cheap, but "We are sorry." is a surprisingly rare thing for a company to say (they will usually sugarcoat it, shift blame, add qualifiers, use weasel words, etc.), so it's refreshing to hear that.

7 hours ago by sunaookami

This is a classic example of a fake apology: "We regret that this incident has caused worry for our partners and people" they are not really "sorry" that data was stolen but only "regret" that their partners are worried. No word on how they will prevent this in the future and how it even happened. Instead it gets downplayed ("legacy third-party","less than 25% were affected" (which is a huge number), no word on what data exactly).

6 hours ago by koliber

How would the apology need to be worded so that it does not get interpreted as a fake apology?

In terms of "downplaying" it seems like they are pretty concrete in sharing the blast radius. If less than 25% of users were affected, how else should they phrase this? They do say that this was data used for onboarding merchants that was on a system that was used in the past and is no longer used.

I am as annoyed by companies sugar coating responses, but here the response sounds refreshingly concrete and more genuine than most.

6 hours ago by berkes

I always presume the "We are sorry" opens up to financial compensation, whereas the "we regret that you are worried" does not.

In my country, this debate is being held WRT the atrocities my country committed in its (former) colonies, and towards enslaved humansš. Our king and prime minister never truly "apologized". Because, I kid you not, the government fears that this opens up possibilities for financial reparation or compensation and the government doesn't want to pay this. They basically searched for the words that sound as close to apologies as possible, but aren't words that require one to act on the apologies.

š I'm talking about The Netherlands. Where such atrocities were committed as close as one and a half generations ago still (1949) (https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/blog/2022/10/how-do-dutc...) but mostly during what is still called "The Golden Age".

6 hours ago by dcminter

This was our mistake, and we take full responsibility.

That preceding line makes it, to me, a real apology. They admit fault.

6 hours ago by contravariant

Seems a bit harsh to leave out the rest of the apology and only focus on the part that is not much of an apology.

5 hours ago by blitzar

> We are fully committed to maintaining your trust.

We are fully committed to rebuilding your trust.

4 hours ago by tippa123

Refreshing to not see "due to an abundance of caution". Kudos to the response in general, they pretty much ticked all boxes.

7 hours ago by prodigycorp

If i was a customer id be pissed off, but this is as good as a response you can have to an incident like this.

- timely response

- initial disclosure by company and not third party

- actual expression of shame and remorse

- a decent explanation of target/scope

i could imagine being cyclical about the statement, but look at other companies who have gotten breached in the past. very few of them do well on all points

5 hours ago by embedding-shape

> - timely response

Timely in what way? Seems they didn't discover the hack themselves, didn't discover it until the hackers themselves reached out last week, and today we're seeing them acknowledging it. I'm not sure anything here could be described as "timely".

4 hours ago by prodigycorp

I have been doing a self Have I Been Pwned audit and, reading many company blog posts, and it wasn't uncommon to see disclosure months after incidents.

4 hours ago by embedding-shape

Yeah, that sucks, and I wouldn't call those "timely" either. Is your point that "timely" is relative and depends on what others are doing? Personally, "slow" is slow regardless of how slow others are, but clearly some would feel differently, that's OK too.

5 hours ago by elAhmo

If we just let the companies go away with 'we are sorry' and say that is as good as it gets, then this industry is up for far more catastrophic situations in the future. Criminal liability, refunds to customers, requirements from regulators might move things in the right direction, but letting companies have shitty practices by hoarding data they don't need and putting customers at risk is definitely something that should be looked at with more scrutiny.

2 hours ago by troyvit

It depends on the crime though right? This was all legacy data and from the description the worst thing they got was contact information that's five years older or more ("internal operational documents and merchant onboarding materials at that time.").

For that level of breach their response seems about right to me, especially waving the money in ShinyHunters' face before giving it away to their enemies.

an hour ago by elAhmo

I agree, it depends, but this wouldn't be the first time company underplayed (or simply lied) about the extent of the breach. I am sure even if it was current data or a more serious breach, the messaging would be similar from their side.

6 hours ago by walletdrainer

> as good as a response you can have to an incident like this.

From customer perspective “in an effort to reduce the likelihood of this data becoming widely available, we’ve paid the ransom” is probably better, even if some people will not like it.

Also to really be transparent it’d be good to post a detailed postmortem along with audit results detailing other problems they (most likely) discovered.

6 hours ago by jacquesm

No, that would not help me as a customer. Because I would never believe that that party would keep their word, besides, it can't be verified. You'll have that shadow hanging around for ever. The good thing is that those assholes now have less budget to go after the next party. The herd is safe from wolves by standing together, not by trying to see which of their number should be sacrificed next.

6 hours ago by walletdrainer

There’s a very real difference between the data possibly still being saved in some huge storage dump of a ransomware group and being available for everybody to exploit on a leak site.

It’s a sliding scale, where payment firmly pushes you in the more comfortable direction.

Also, the uncomfortable truth is that ransomware payments are very common. Not paying will make essentially no difference, the business would probably still be incredibly lucrative even if payment rates dropped to 5% of what they are now.

If there was global co-operation to outlaw ransom payments, that’d be great. Until then, individual companies refusing to pay is largely pointless.

6 hours ago by rollcat

Never pay the ransom.

The extortionist knows they cannot prove they destroyed the data, so they will eventually sell it anyway.

They will maybe hold off for a bit to prove their "reputation" or "legitimacy". Just don't pay.

6 hours ago by walletdrainer

If this is actually frequently happening, your claim should be pretty easy to prove. Most stolen databases are sold fairly publicly.

The ransom payments tend to be so big anyway that selling the data and associated reputational damage is most likely not worth the hassle.

Basic game theory shows that the best course of action for any ransomware group with multiple victims is to act honestly. You can never be sure, but the incentives are there and they’re pretty obvious.

The big groups are making in the neighbourhood of $billions, earning extra millions by sabotaging their main source of revenue seems ridiculous.

6 hours ago by tobyhinloopen

I strongly disagree. Paying the ransom will put everyone in danger.

6 hours ago by walletdrainer

I would totally agree with you if we lived in a hypothetical world where ransomware payments aren’t super common anyway.

Until there is legislation to stop these payments, there will be countless situations where paying is simply the best option.

6 hours ago by croemer

Depends. Not paying ransom decreases the likelihood of being attacked in the future.

6 hours ago by walletdrainer

Probably not that significantly, these are primarily crimes of opportunity. An attacker isn’t likely to do much research on the company until they already have access, and that point they might as well proceed (especially since getting hit a second time would be doubly awkward for the company, presumably dramatically increasing the chances of payment)

And selling the data from companies like Checkout.com is generally still worth a decent amount, even if nowhere close to the bigger ransom payments.

7 hours ago by lexlambda

The donation is more or less virtue signaling rather than actual insight.

The problem can not be helped by research research against cybercrime. Proper practices for protections are well established and known, they just need to be implemented.

The amount donated should've rather be invested into better protections / hiring a person responsible in the company.

(Context: The hack happened on a not properly decomissioned legacy system.)

6 hours ago by dspillett

> The donation is more or less virtue signalling rather than actual insight.

I see it more as a middle finger to the perps: “look, we can afford to pay, here, see us pay that amount elsewhere, but you aren't getting it”. It isn't signalling virtue as much as it is signalling “fuck you and your ransom demands” in the hope that this will mark them as not an easy target for that sort of thing in future.

6 hours ago by bonesss

It also serves as a proxy for a punishment. They are, from one perspective, paying a voluntary fine based on their own assessment of their security failings.

For customers it signals sincerity and may help dampen outrage in their follow up dealings.

16 minutes ago by whimsicalism

Requiring everyone to implement proper practices is one way of addressing the problem, I might call it Sisyphean & impossible.

Making it illegal to pay ransom is likely a much easier to implement and more effective solution.

And this isn’t virtue signaling - they literally did the virtuous thing that is better for society at the expense of their bottom line. That is just virtue.

19 minutes ago by dominicrose

Virtue signaling is an insult that you can for example use against greenwashing or against someone who pledged to donate a lot of money to some charity but actually donated none or much less. Hypocrisy is also a form of virtue signaling.

It's also a term you can use against political opponents because it's much easier to speak well than to actually do good.

Refusing to negociate with criminals and help fund security seems like the proper long-term reaction for everyone.

4 hours ago by Timpy

Yes but I think it's a good virtue to signal considering the circumstances. If they paid the ransom that would signal that ransoming this company works, incentivizing more ransoms. If they refuse to pay the ransom it might signal that they care more about money than they do integrity. Taking the financial hit of the ransom, but paying it to something that signals their values, is about the best move I can imagine.

13 minutes ago by whimsicalism

Bravo - I find this incredibly courageous and will consider being their customer in the future.

6 hours ago by arbll

> The attackers gained access to a legacy, third-party cloud file storage system.

I think the answer is ok but the "third-party" bit reads like trying to deflect part of the blame on the cloud storage provider.

6 hours ago by zwnow

The whole codebase & tools at whatever company I ever worked at was using 99% legacy stuff. Its wild...

Often times it would have been easier to rebuild the whole project over trying to upgrade 5-6 year old dependencies.

Ultimately the companies do not care about these kinda incidents. They say sorry, everyone laughs at them for a week and then after its business as usual, with that one thing fixed and still rolling legacy stuff for everything else.

5 hours ago by weird-eye-issue

> Often times it would have been easier to rebuild the whole project

Sure buddy, sure

4 hours ago by zwnow

I inherited a few codebases as solo dev and I am confident in my abilities to refactor each of them in 1-2 months without issues.

I can imagine that in a team that might be harder, but these are glorified todo apps. I am well aware that complete rebuilds rarely work out.

2 hours ago by skeeter2020

Interesting spin for a core infrastructure provider who deals with the most sensitive part of most businesses, tries to bury the lede of getting hacked with a tale of their virtuous refusal to pay a ransom; is this supposed to make them attractive or just have people skip the motivating events? Swing and a miss in my books.

6 hours ago by globalise83

"The system was used for internal operational documents and merchant onboarding materials at that time"

To me it seems most likely that this is data collected during the KYC process during onboarding, meaning company documents, director passport or ID card scans, those kind of things. So the risk here for at least a few more years until all identity documents have expired is identity theft possibilities (e.g. fraudsters registering their company with another PSP using the stolen documents and then processing fraudulent payments until they get shut down, or signing up for bank accounts using their info and tax id).

5 hours ago by saberience

Passport or ID card scans would never be be stored alongside general KYB information, e.g. the standard forms PSPs use.

If you read between the lines of the verbiage here, it looks like a general archived dropbox of stuff like PDF documents which the onboarding team used.

Since GDPR etc, items like passports, driving license data etc, has been kept in far more secure areas that low-level staff (e.g. people doing merchant onboarding) won't have easy access to.

I could be wrong but I would be fairly surprised if JPGs of passports were kept alongside docx files of merchant onboarding questionnaires.

4 hours ago by nebezb

> Passport or ID card scans would never be be stored alongside general KYB information

How do you qualify this statement? Did you mean “should never”? Even then, you’re likely overstating things. Nothing prevents co-locating KYC/KYB information. On the contrary, most businesses conducting KYB are required to conduct UBO and they’re trained to combine them both. Register as a director/officer with any FSI in North America and you’ll see.

2 hours ago by saberience

Fair point! Yeah, it could be. Although Europe tends to be stricter about those things, i.e. where PII is stored. I was trained way back in like 2018 about ensuring I never have any PII stored on my PC and around the requirements of the GDPR in terms of access to information and right to delete etc.

5 hours ago by globalise83

docx files of merchant onboarding questionnaires

Why would merchants fill out docx files? They would submit an online form with their business, director and UBO details, that data would be stored in the Checkout.com merchants database, and any supporting documents like passport scans would be stored in a cloud storage system, just like the one that got hacked.

If it was just some internal PDFs used by the onboarding team, probably they wouldn't make such a big announcement.

3 hours ago by saberience

Another person wrote a good response to this but yeah, I would say, as someone that has worked in fintech, you will almost always have some integrations with systems which require Microsoft word format, as well as obviously PDFs, CSVs, etc.

Every country you operate in has different rules and regulations and you have to integrate with many third party systems as well as governmental entities etc, and sometimes you have to do really really technically backwards things.

Some integrations I remember were stuff like cron jobs sending CSV files via FTP which were automatically picked up.

4 hours ago by bostik

If you are dealing with financial services (and payment provider most certainly would), you will be forced to interface with infuriating vendor vetting and onboarding questionnaire processes. The kinds that would make Franz Kafka blush, and CIA take notice for their enhanced interrogation techniques.

The sheer amount of effectively useless bingo sheets with highly detailed business (and process) information boggles the mind.

Some time ago I alluded to existence and proliferation of these questionnaires in another context: https://bostik.iki.fi/aivoituksia/random/crowdstrike-outage-...

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