That timeline is unreadable. Just say what was found impacted when with versions along with patch dates and versions. I don't need to know about case studies that will hypothetically be written. I don't need little blurbs under everything. "What we said" should instead be "publicly disclosed."
Honestly the whole thing should be a table so you can group the different bits of the timeline for different software/services by software/service rather than time.
I call these "slop disclosures". I have slop fatigue.
The first hint in <x>2Shell. The first twenty times it was ok, now, itâs just lazy.
It's been known for a while, and certainly long before the recent AI vuln flood, that ghostscript is really problematic in terms of security.
Ultimately, postscript is its own programming language, and executing a programming language in a secure, sandboxed way is not trivial. ghostscript has only a very poor pseudo sandbox that fails regularly. Unfortunately, ghostscript is the only implementation of postscript that's out there.
All of that would matter much less if people only used it to parse postscript. But it's used indirectly by imagemagick (you can disable it), which means many people using imagemagick to parse images from untrusted sources get exposed to ghostscript's poor security.
> Unfortunately, ghostscript is the only implementation of postscript that's out there.
That needs lots of qualifiers. It's the only popular and widely distributed open-source implementation with known good performance and wide compatibility.
There were so many other implementations and vibed ports already that I expect ghostscript to be actually replaced in distros within a year or two. Very random example https://github.com/AndyCappDev/postforge
Yes, and people didn't previously write big webpages, come up with a fancy name, and notify about a dozen different companies before just writing a ghostscript fix.
> Unfortunately, ghostscript is the only implementation of postscript that's out there.
This sounds like an afternoonâs worth of prompting could double the number of implementations.
Hopefully few people install Ghostscript if they don't need it, on a server that processes user uploads
You install ImageMagick, it most likely depends on Ghostscript.
You use something else than ImageMagick, say, to resize an uploaded image, and the moment it sees a color-managed image, it will produce something that looks like puke.
I had to do a very custom build of ImageMagick to get rid of dependencies on libgs and libX11. It wasn't fun.
Yeah, sadly true
This seems like important information but this page is completely unreadable.
For those on Debian, the usual:
It's of course hidden behind a tiny link, but there's information at https://pwn.ai/upload2shell/research.html
Seriously, it's just such a bad design. Extremely dense but at the same time extremely devoid of any info. Sorry for the broad negativity here, but this page just screams "I want CVE cred" without providing any useful info on whether this is a "patch now pants on fire" or "yeah maybe next cycle".
At least they didn't lead with a useless CVSS score like all the other vulnerabilities we see popping up now.
This is just what slop sites look like. The LLM doesn't "understand" that the reader doesn't have it's context window in front of them when reading their output (i.e., the webpage) because to it everything is in the same bucket. IMHO this is probably because the attention of the transformer model by design lights up details that are relevant to the model but irrelevant to the reader.
Same goes for basically any descriptive text they output (documentation, comments, commit messages, etc).
Are webfonts passed to Ghostscript as-is when printing a webpage on a raster device?
We shoukd be suspicious of random PS and PDF attachements until patched everywhere.
ghostscript, imagemagick, ffmpeg, etc. etc. all these passthrough data in data out programs that don't need much of anything from the system, I'd think people would run them with untrusted input in a tight whitelist based seccomp+landlock sandbox. it's a bit annoying if they are not statically compiled, due to ld.so loading libraries, but possible.
> I'd think people would run them with untrusted input in a tight whitelist based seccomp+landlock sandbox.
in fact, many do. if you're not doing this all your unsafe file processing in 2026, you're in for a bad time!
We should just use wasm for all this stuff
ghostscript is everywhere. It's also AGPL, which I am not certain is commonly understood.
Do you think people will finally start removing decade old cruft from libraries and/or start creating single purpose minimal libraries? Or will the defense be just reactionary and on per cve basis?
For sure, having thousands of thousands of minimal libraries is truly what made NPM...
like left-pad :PP
Seems like they did the right thing disclosure wise anyway.
Who cares about the name all bugs get stupid names.
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